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Abstract
Environmental issues such as air and water quality related to livestock production
currently receive much attention. Potential methods for environmental improvement range
from regulation to market solutions. This study looks at consumer willingness to pay for
pork products with embedded environmental attributes. Experimental auctions showed
that over one-half of the participants (62%) paid a premium, that did not vary significantly
between differing regions of the United States. (JEL Codes Q13, Q25)

Copyright 1999 by Sean P. Hurley and James B. Kliebenstein. All rights reserved.
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by
any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.

Introduction
Environmental issues related to livestock production have received much attention.
These include surface and ground water quality and livestock odors. A standard way of
dealing with non-point source pollution from livestock production has been to encourage
the use of best management practices (BMP). While this approach may improve the
environment, economic incentives for farmers to adopt these practices are needed as well.
Recently there has been a rise in interest for organic agriculture. The importance
of organic agriculture stems from the perceived attributes embedded within organic
products. Klonsky and Tourte identify an existing perception that organic agriculture
provides solutions to problems related to environmental quality, food safety, the viability
of rural communities, and market concentration. Hence, organic farming has the
perception of a market which provides incentives to farmers to follow good environmental
production practices.
Due to this rise in interest of organic agriculture, issues such as willingness-to-pay
for organic produce (Misra et al.) and marketing organic products (Thompson and
Kidwell; Thompson; Lohr; Krissoff; Duram) have received increased attention. While
premiums are being paid for organic agriculture (Dobbs), it is difficult to know which
attributes within organic products are commanding these premiums. There have been
many studies that have investigated one of the perceived attributes, the issues of food
safety (Roosen et al.; Fox et al., 1994; Fox et al., 1995), but little has been done in the
area of embedded environmental attributes with no physical or health attributes.
This paper presents results from measuring what pork consumers indicate an
improved (sustainable) environment is worth to them. Participants included urban and
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rural residents from Iowa, Kansas, Vermont, Oregon, and North Carolina. Surveys and
experimental auctions were used to obtain participant willingness-to-pay for pork products
produced with potentially different environmental improvements and/or impacts.
Specifically, the environmental improvements in this study were related to a reduction in
livestock odor, and surface and ground water impacts through swine manure storage and
application methods.
Several hypotheses are tested. One is whether consumers indicate they will pay a
premium for pork products with embedded environmental attributes. Another is whether
there is a significant difference between these premiums for different regions of the United
States. A third hypothesis is whether premiums differ significantly as environmental
attribute levels increase or are combined. We demonstrate in this paper that consumers
are willing to pay a premium for pork products that are produced in systems that have
improved environmental attributes.
Study Design and Data
Data collection consisted of two main parts: surveys and auction experiments.
There were two surveys conducted during each experimental session. The first survey
was conducted before the auction and collected personal information and information on
participants’perception about industry issues. Some of the specific information collected
was age, gender, household income, and education. The second survey was conducted
immediately following the auction. This survey dealt with participant knowledge about
pork production and contained questions pertaining to methods of obtaining
environmental attributes in products. These questions were related to issues such as
methods of manure storage and application and livestock production facilities.
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The auction method used was a second-priced sealed-bid auction segmented into
five bidding rounds. There have been many studies that have demonstrated the usefulness
of experimental auctions for this type of marketing research (Hoffman et al.; Hayes et al.;
Melton et al., Oct. 1996; Melton et al., Nov. 1996). It has been found that in multiple
round experimental second price auctions, participants learn that the dominant strategy is
to bid their true valuation for a good (Coppinger et al.; Cox et al., Shogren et al., 1994).
Hence, it is in the best interest of the participants to reveal their true valuation for the item
being auctioned. This implies that the second price auction is theoretically demand
revealing (Hoffman et al.; Menkhaus et al.) which was first discovered by Vickrey.
To familiarize the participants with the second price auction, we first used a
preliminary auction to sell candy bars. This allowed the participants to become familiar
with the second price auction. After this first auction was completed, we ran a multiple
trial second price auction with the pork products. In the first three rounds of this auction,
participants bid only on the physical attributes of the product having no other information
except for the previous round’s bids. This allowed participants to become familiar with
the auction process and obtain feedback on price information. In the fourth round, the
participants were informed of the specific environmental attributes associated with the
respective products. This information shock allowed us to determine what the effect of
releasing environmental information had on participants’bids. In the fifth round, the
implications of the environmental attributes were further explained and the participants
were allowed to bid a final time. Following Fox et al. (1995, 1996), we controlled for
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wealth effects1 by randomly choosing at the end of the experiment both one round and one
product from that selected round to be the product sold.
The products used to elicit bids were two-pound packages of uniformly cut,
boneless, 1¼ inch pork loin chops. These pork loin chops were cut and packaged to look
as uniform as possible. The first three rounds of bidding allowed us to identify if the
packages provided were perceived as similar. Thus, in round four, participants were only
bidding on the environmental attribute information provided. Bid responses would reflect
the value of the environmental attribute. The participants were allowed simultaneously to
bid on ten different packages of pork chops each having different environmental attributes.
The packages of pork chops were arranged in a row, and placed on ice in one of three
white coolers. Each of the ten packages were labeled as Package i, where i = 1,.., 10. For
each experiment, after the third round each participant was told that one package was a
“typical package” with no particular environmental attributes. In this same round, the
other nine packages were assigned varying levels of environmental attributes dealing with
ground water, surface water, and odor. Odor reduction was at two levels: a 30-40
percent reduction, and an 80-90 percent reduction over the “typical” product. Ground
water and surface water impacts were also available at two levels: a 15-25 percent
reduction and a 40-50 percent reduction over the “typical” product. Packages were
provided with single attributes (only air, ground water, or surface water), double
attributes, or all three attributes embedded. The double and triple attribute pork packages
were all at the high reduction levels.

1

Wealth effects are when participants change their bids because they won an earlier trial (Fox et al.,
1995) See Davis and Holt for a discussion of wealth effects in experimental markets.
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Experiments were conducted in six different areas of the United States: Ames,
Iowa; Iowa Falls, Iowa; Manhattan, Kansas; Raleigh, North Carolina; Burlington,
Vermont; and Corvallis, Oregon. Three experiments were conducted at each site. Two
sites for the Iowa experiments represented a rural site (Iowa Falls) where there is a high
concentration of hog production and a site (Ames) with a lower livestock concentration.
For North Carolina, a total of six experiments were conducted. Two sets of experiments
were conducted in the Raleigh, North Carolina area because it was determined following
the first experiment that a random procedure was not followed in selection of participants.
Thus, a second set of experiments was conducted. The last six surveys/experiments were
conducted in Burlington, Vermont and Corvallis, Oregon.
At each site, each experiment lasted about two hours. The first experiment was
conducted at 9:00 a.m., the second at 11:30 a.m., and the third at 2:00 p.m. To control
for bias in package labeling, we switched the corresponding package number with the
assigned environmental attribute for each of the different time slots. A random sample of
individuals from the area being studied was used to obtain participants for the study. This
sample was obtained by a random computer generated sample drawn from telephone
numbers in the respective local telephone directory. Each participant was paid forty
dollars for participating in the experiment.
Results and Discussion
Of the 333 participants in our study, results from 329 were usable. (See Table 1
for the break down of the number of participants by region.) Premium payers are defined
as those who increased their bid from the no information round (round three) to the
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information round (round four) on the most environmental package.2 Using this definition,
we found that approximately 62 percent of the 329 participants increased their bid for the
most environmental good, the product with all three attributes— air, ground water and
surface water quality improvements.
Information in Table 1 summarizes the distribution of participants by study region.
The range in number of participants was 60 for the Corvallis, Oregon location to 27 for
Burlington, Vermont. The number of participants willing to pay a premium ranged from
55 percent at Burlington, Vermont to 67 percent at Manhattan, Kansas. Hence, in all the
study regions more than one-half of the participants indicated a willingness to pay for the
pork product with all three environmental attributes of air, ground water, and surface
water embedded.
Table 1: Number of Participants by Area
Experiment
Area
All areas
Ames, IA
Manhattan, KS
Raleigh, NC (6/28/97)
Burlington, VT
Iowa Falls, IA
Corvallis, OR
Raleigh, NC (6/27/98)

Number of
Participants

Number of
Premium Payers

329
49
60
31
27
58
60
44

204
30
40
19
15
35
38
27

Number of
Non-Premium
Payers
125
19
20
12
12
23
22
17

Percent Premium
Payers
62
61
67
61
56
60
63
61

For the entire group, the average premium paid for the most environmental twopound package of pork loin chops was $0.94, while the typical package decreased by

2

By defining the premium in this manner, we avoid the problem that the Vickrey auction in laboratory
settings is biased. Cox, Smith and Walker and Kagel, Harstad and Levin have shown that these biases
remain somewhat constant across bidding rounds. Coursey and Smith have also found that the bias in
absolute terms tends to be the same. Hence by calculating the willingness to pay by taking the difference
from the no information round to the information round should give us an unbiased true revelation of the
premium a participant would be willing to pay.
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$0.52 (Table 2). The bids in the no information round are much tighter than the bids in
the round in which the environmental information was released. The difference between
the average high and low bid in the no information round is only $0.35. This would reflect
the participant perception of the visual quality of the packages. For the most
environmental package, the premium was significantly different from zero at the 0.001
significance level. This result also holds true when looking at the premiums from each
region.
The bids take on a methodical pattern once the information was released. In the
no information round, the bids appear to be scattered randomly among the packages.
Once the information was released about the environmental attributes, the bids followed
the pattern of the more environmental pork packages getting the higher bids and the less
environmental packages getting the lower bids. Thus, values for the single attribute
packages were slightly higher than the typical package. Participants paid more for the
dual attribute packages than the single attribute packages, while the triple attribute
package commanded the highest premium.
When testing the hypothesis of whether premiums differ significantly as
environmental attribute levels are increased or combined, we found that at the five percent
level each tier of attributes were significantly different from the other tiers. Hence, the
package with three high level attributes was significantly different from the packages with
two attributes, as well as, with the packages with just one attribute. It did not seem to
matter what level of attribute was embedded in the package, rather it was the number of
attributes. These results hold for the comparison of all participants as well as for the
comparison of the premium payers.
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Table 2: Participant Bid Levels by Environmental Attribute Information (All Participants)
Average Bid Level per Package ($)
Pork Chop Environmental Attributes
(Level of Improvement)
No Specific Attributes (Typical)
Odor 30-40%
Odor 80-90%
Ground water 15-25%
Ground water 40-50%
Surface Water 15-25%
Surface Water 40-50%
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50%
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50%
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40
50%/Surface Water 40-50%

No Information
4.13
4.26
4.05
3.91
4.03
4.15
4.06
4.25
4.17
4.19

Environmental
Attribute Added
3.61
3.87
3.92
3.85
3.94
3.99
4.10
4.56
4.58
5.13

Premium Bid
Absolute
Change*
-0.52a
-0.39a
-0.13b
-0.06b,c
-0.09b,c,d
-0.16b,c,d
0.04c,d
0.31e
0.41e
0.94

*

Corresponding letters indicate that at the five percent level of significance the null hypothesis of the two
premiums being equal could not be rejected.

Evaluation of the premium payers shows that the average premium was $1.60 for
the most environmental package— a premium of 37 percent (Table 3). The premium
payers decreased their bid for the typical package when the environmental information was
released. Hence, this suggests that there could be a backlash with respect to the typical
good once an environmental good hits the market. Premium payers followed the same
methodical bidding pattern as the whole group. As shown in Table 3, the bids for the
package with a single environmental attribute package from an eight percent decline (odor
30-40 percent) to a four percent increase (surface water 40-50 percent) following release
of information. The bids for the double attribute packages increased from 12 to 16
percent while the bid for the triple attribute package increased by 37 percent.
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Percent
Change
-12.53
-9.19
-3.23
-1.45
-2.12
-3.94
0.97
7.41
9.88
22.42

Table 3: Participant Bid Levels for Premium Payers
Average Bid Level per Package ($)
Pork Chop Environmental Attributes
(Level of Improvement)
No Specific Attributes (Typical)
Odor 30-40%
Odor 80-90%
Ground water 15-25%
Ground water 40-50%
Surface Water 15-25%
Surface Water 40-50%
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50%
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50%
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50%

No Information
4.44
4.53
4.33
4.14
4.34
4.41
4.36
4.57
4.47
4.37

Environmental
Attribute Added
3.81
4.15
4.29
4.17
4.40
4.31
4.54
5.13
5.21
5.98

Premium Bid
Absolute
Change
-0.63
-0.38
-0.04
0.03
0.06
-0.10
0.18
0.56
0.74
1.60

Bid premiums for the most environmental product are provided by study area in
Table 4. For participants, the highest average premium of $1.11 was obtained from the
second group from Raleigh, North Carolina and the lowest average premium of $0.79 was
obtained in Iowa Falls, Iowa. When looking at just the premium payers, the highest
average premium of $1.89 was in Burlington, Vermont, while the lowest average premium
of $1.33 was from the first group from Raleigh, North Carolina. Using a standard
statistical test of difference between means (Freund), we found, at the five percent
significance level, no significant differences between regions for the most environmental
package. This was similar for when all participants or when premium payers were
evaluated. Thus, there was not a significant difference in bid premiums between areas.
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Percent
Change
-14.11%
-8.47%
-0.91%
0.63%
1.28%
-2.20%
4.11%
12.20%
16.47%
36.70%

Table 4: Bid Premiums ($) for the Most Environmental Package by Area (All Participants and Premium Payers)
Location
Pork Chop Environmental
Attributes (Level of Improvement)
All Participants
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50%
Premium Payers
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50%

All
Areas

Ames,
IA

Manhattan,
KS

Raleigh,
NC (97)

Burlington,
VT

Iowa
Falls, IA

Corvallis,
OR

Raleigh,
NC (98)

0.94*

1.03*

0.89*

0.80*

0.95*

0.79*

1.00*

1.11*

1.60*

1.74*

1.38*

1.33*

1.89*

1.60*

1.59*

1.84*

*

denotes significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level.

D. Conclusions
Of the 329 participants in the experiment, 62 percent paid a premium for the product
with all three environmental attributes: air, ground water and surface water. For the entire
group, the average premium paid for the most environmental two-pound package of pork
loin chops was $0.94— a premium of 22 percent. When evaluated for the premium payers
(the 62%) the average premium was $1.60 per package— a premium of 37 percent.
Results show that participants were willing to pay higher prices for pork products
produced in systems with improved environmental attributes. The premium for products
with embedded multi-environmental attributes was significantly greater than for those with
single environmental attributes. The level of willingness to pay did not vary significantly
across regions for the most environmental package. Participants were also willing to pay
more for the product with improved surface water, ground water, and odor emissions than
for the product with just two of the attributes. Thus, it appears that the product with the
greatest chance of success is one that has all three attributes embedded.
For the most environmental package, bid premiums did not differ significantly
between areas studied. Moreover, the percent of participants paying selected premium
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levels did not vary between regions. For example, for the triple attribute product, 62
percent of the participants indicated a willingness to pay a premium. This ranged from 56
to 67 percent across the study area.
This research shows that opportunity exists in developing a market for meat
products that embody environmental attributes. Consumers are concerned about the
environment and are willing to pay more for products that are produced in a way that
reduces environmental impacts. This research suggests that as the industry develops
methods that help sustain or improve the environment, there is a segment of society that
will support a market for such products.
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